SCPSC-2010 ENTRANCE TEST

[Virtual Presenter] 1947-48 operations : QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Q1. After the loss of Jhangar, a significant victory was achieved by the Indian Army in Operation Kipper. Discuss Operation Kipper under the following heads (a) Pakistani disposition and Indian forces available for attack. (b) Indian attack plan. (c) Indian deception plan. (d) Indian artillery and air support for above operation. (e) Lessons learnt..

[Audio] 2 (a) (i) Pakistani Dispositions. Their defences were based at Kot, Pathradi, and Uparla Dandesar. The defences were well sited and mutually supporting. The strength was estimated to be one battalion. (ii) Indian forces Available for Attack for Op Kipper. 50 Para Brigade Group with the following units and supporting elements: (aa) 2/2 Punjab. (ab) 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry. (ac) Approximately 3 additional companies. (ad) A Squadron, 7 Cavalry. (ae) Two field / mountain batteries. (af) Headquarters and other support elements. (b) Indian Attack Plan. A two pronged attack was planned as under: (i) 2/2 Punjab to attack Point 3227 and Kot from the West. (ii) 3 (Para) Maratha light infantry to capture Pathradi / Point 3284 and Uparla Dandesar. (iii) A map of the area of Operation Kipper is attached as Appendix A (c) Deception Plan. The following measures were taken to make the enemy believe that an attack for the recapture of Jhangar was in the offing: (i) Armoured car detachments and strong patrols operated on tracks West of Naushera for three days preceding the operation. (ii) Rumours suggesting imminent 50 Para Brigade advance to Jhangar were spread. (iii) Local mules and donkeys were requisitioned ostensibly for the advance to Jhangar and located at Beri Pattan. (d) Artillery and Air Support for Op Kipper. (i) Artillery. Artillery covering fire proved effective particularly in neutralizing en‟s automatic weapons, and in breaking up his counter attacks. It was also used to indicate targets to aircraft. (ii) Air Support. The salient features were: (aa) Interdiction tasks were carried out on 01 Feb 48 from 0730 hours to 1540 hours by a series of Tempest sorties. (ab) Pockets of resistance, enemy fortifications in the north east and the retreating enemy were engaged successfully. (e) Lessons Learnt from Op Kipper. (i) Mopping Up. Mopping up of enemy and occupation of dominating ground on reaching the objective is essential on capturing an objective. The enemy who was completely surprised remained undetected. The enemy reoccupied defences necessitating another attack..

[Audio] 3 (ii) Location of Tactical Headquarters. The battalion tactical headquarters should be well forward as to be able to appreciate emergent situations and influence the course of operations. (iii) Reserves. Reserves must be available at the unit and sub unit level for application at critical stages. The brigade reserve, unlike the 2/2 Punjab reserve was well positioned to launch a timely counter attack. (iv) Exploitation. It is most beneficial to earmark a battalion reserve for exploitation tasks. The achievements of battalion patrols sent to exploit the success at Kot were limited. (v) Location of Forward Observation Officers (FOOs). Presence of F-O-O at the forefront of operations enables speedy overpowering of enemy resistance. (vi) Evacuation of Casualties. Establishment of relay posts is necessary for speedy casualty evacuation from Regimental Aid Posts to Advanced Dressing Stations..

[Audio] 4 Q2. With regards to the Tithwal offensive launched by the Indian forces in May 1948, discuss the salient aspects of appreciation carried out by Commander 163 Brigade and his final plan for the offensive. Also discuss the reasons for rapid success in Tithwal sector. (a) Commander 163 Brigade appreciated the following with regards to the Tithwal offensive: (i) Enemy Characteristics. Avoids pitched battle. He is very nervous about his rear and the threat of his line of communication being cut off. (ii) Relative Strength. The enemy strength of 6150 was quite considerable even though the enemy was scattered in small parties..

[Audio] 5 (iii) Maintenance. The difficult terrain and the long line of communication required to maintain the large force were limiting factors. (b) Attack Plan for Capture of Tithwal. (i) Phase I Secure Dogarpur and Trahagam ridges. (ii) Phase 2. Capture of Chokibal. (iii) Phase 3. Capture of Nastachhun pass (10000 feet). (iv) A map of the area of Tithwal is attached as Appendix B (c) Surprise. To achieve surprise, it was planned to utilise the most difficult and least expected route. Indian forces were on both sides of Tithwal and by attacking the enemy from an unexpected direction, they were able to achieve surprise. (d) Rapid success in Tithwal sector was achieved due to: (i) Surprise. The enemy did not expect major threat along this axis. (ii) Speedy advance. (iii) Weaker Opposition. It was weak as compared to that of the main axis. (iv) Planning and Preparation. Elaborate planning and preparation were undertaken prior to launching of the operation..

[Audio] 6 Q3. What was Brigadier Usman’s plan to capture Sabzkot and MG Hill and what were the reasons for failure of these attacks? (a) Brigadier Usman‟s Plan to Capture Sabzkot and MG Hill. As a direct advance to Sabzkot was not feasible due to the exposed left flank, the plan envisaged evicting the enemy from MG Hill to make way for the attack on Sabzkot. The operation was planned for 21 May 48 as follows: (i) 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry to clear enemy at MG Hill. (ii) 2 Rajputana Rifles to attack Sabzkot from the Northern flank. (iii) Enemy field fortifications to be degraded by artillery and tanks before the assault. (b) Reasons for Failure of the Attacks. (i) Enemy Strength. Under estimation of enemy strength to be of one company instead of a battalion strength in each of the battalion objectives. (ii) Effective Mutual Support Between Enemy Locations. Both the en battalions were mutually supporting. (iii) The enemy‟s flanks were protected either due to the terrain configuration or by deployment of automatic weapons and mortars. (iv) Depth of Enemy Defences. With a few bunkers located on the forward slope, the main defences were camouflaged and had considerable depth. (v) Strong enemy reserves. (vi) Loss of Surprise. An attack by night was not opted due to difficult nature of the terrain. Hence surprise was lost. (vii) Deception. Enemy effort could not be diverted to the North from MG Hill due to lack of progress of operations of 2 Rajputana Rifles. (viii) Inadequate Availability of Artillery. Engagement of enemy reinforcements on the move obviated neutralisation of enemy defences in depth and reverse slopes. (ix) Lack of air support due to bad weather. (x) Enemy depth localities were not engageable by tanks..

[Audio] 7 Q4. With the capture of Rajauri in April 1948, Indian forces were posed to link up with Poonch. Discuss Operation Gulab conducted for the first link up with Poonch giving the plan for linkup, forces available and a brief analysis of the overall operation. (a) Plan for the First Link up with Poonch. It was planned that two forces would advance from Rajauri and Poonch and link up at Surankote as follows: (i) 19 Independent Brigade to advance on route Rajauri – Thana Mandi – Surankote in three phases as under: (aa) Phase 1. Establishment of a firm base at Thana Mandi on D day. (ab) Phase 2. Advance and link up with the Poonch column on D plus 1. (ac) Phase 3. Capture of Mendhar.. (ii) One battalion of the Poonch brigade to advance from Poonch to Potha and there on to Surankot..

[Audio] 8 (iii) An illustration of the first link up with Poonch is attached as Appendix C (b) Troops Available for Op Gulab. The advancing column consisted of the following units and subunits: (i) 1 Kumaon Rifles. (ii) 1 /2 Punjab. (iii) 5 Mountain Battery. (iv) One troop of Central India Horse. (v) Engineer elements. (vi) One platoon of Medium machine guns. (vii) Animal transport and civilian porters. (c) Analysis of the Op Gulab. (i) The link up between the Rajauri and Poonch forces was a very significant achievement. (ii) However, soon after the process was completed, the enemy re established their presence throughout the area between Rajauri and Poonch. (iii) Prominent objectives like Thana Mandi and Mendhar could not be garrisoned due to lack of troops. This entailed their recapture once again during the course of the final link up with Poonch in Nov 48..

[Audio] 9 Q5. List the major factors which saved Srinagar from the onslaught of the raiders in Oct 1947. The factors which saved Srinagar from the onslaught of the raiders in Oct 1947 were as follows: (a) The delay imposed by the state forces at Muzaffarabad. (b) The delay imposed by Brigadier Rajinder Singh‟s party at Uri. (c) Time wasted by the raiders in their rampage at Baramulla. (d) 1 Sikh‟s delaying action at Baramulla and Pattan. (e) 4 Kumaon‟s heroic stand at Badgam. Q6. After first phase of operations in Kashmir were over with capture of Uri on 13 Nov 1947, the Defence Committee of the cabinet held a meeting on 14 Nov to decide on the future courses of action. What were the instructions conveyed to Army Headquarters? The following instructions were conveyed by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to Army Headquarters after the meeting on 14 Nov 1947: (a) Deny the Jhelum valley approach to the enemy. (b) Thereafter, replace Indian Army personnel by state troops and police to concentrate them around Srinagar and carry out a sustained and general withdrawal to India as demands for aid to civil power in Kashmir reduce. (c) In view of the withdrawal and poor flying conditions in winter, Jammu BanihalSrinagar route should be open in winters. (d) It was necessary to establish a force in Jammu to give required aid to civil power to suppress disorder and protect minorities. (e) It was further necessary to despatch small mobile columns to relieve and evacuate beleaguered garrisons near the Jammu Uri Poonch road. The columns were also to evacuate endangered non Muslims near that road..

[Audio] 10 Q7. Discuss the Indian operations to capture Rajauri in Apr 1948 under the following heads: (a) Disposition of Pakistani forces in general area Rajauri. (b) Indian forces tasked for capture of Rajauri. (c) Outline plan for capture of Rajauri. (d) Diversionary operations planned by Indian Army. (e) Pakistani reactions to the loss of Rajauri..

[Audio] 11 (a) Disposition of Pakistani Forces in Gen A Rajauri in Apr 48. (i) One enemy battalion equipped with 3 inch mortars and light machine guns was deployed astride the Naushera – Chingas road with a bias of strength towards the western side. (ii) Barwali ridge on the West of the road and Mal to the East were held in strength. (iii) The local population was predominantly hostile. (iv) The frontline units were comprised mainly of state force deserters, ex soliders and locals. (v) The enemy establised blocks on the Nadpur – Chingas sector of the road and probably mined it. (b) Indian Forces Tasked for Capture of Rajauri. 19 Indep Inf Bde Group comprising of the following major units: (i) 2 Rajputana Rifles. (ii) 4 Dogra. (iii) 1 Kumaon Rifles. (iv) 5 J-A-T (Under command for the operation). (v) Central India Horse. (c) Outline Plan for Capture of Rajauri. (i) 2 Rajputana Rifles less 2 Companies (Right Flank). To capture Mal Ring Contour. (ii) 5 J-A-T (Left Flank). To advance from Tanda and secure Point 3831 and 4622.. (iii) 4 Dogra (Centre). To advance in the centre and attack Barwali ridge and thereafter advance to Santogala forest. (iv) 1 Kumaon Rifles. To pass through and attack Chingas. (v) Central India Horse. (aa) The Regiment less two squadrons to support 4 Dogra operations. (ab) Two squadrons to clear road Naushera Chingas and occupy Chingas. (vi) An illustration of the plan to capture Rajauri is attached as Appendix A (d) Diversionary Operations Planned by Indian Army. (i) 50 Para Brigade. In area Khinratta on Jhangar Kotli road on D plus one. (ii) 80 Infantry Brigade. In area Dharmsal in Beri Pattan sector on D minus one..

[Audio] 12 (e) Pakistani Reactions to Capture of Rajauri. (i) The enemy launched co ordinated attacks on 16 Apr 48. (ii) Jhangar and Naushera and adjacent areas including Pir Thil Nakka. Yadav picquet, Kaman Gosha Gala and Nothi Dhar were attacked. (iii) Troops of 1 Rajput and 2/2 Punjab put up a determined resistance in the face of the enemy onslaughts. 1 Sikh Light Infantry reinforced 2/2 Punjab which bore the brunt of the attacks. (iv) By 18 Apr 48 the enemy was beaten back..

[Audio] 13 Q 8. Discuss the tasks in general and the tasks in particular assigned to the J-A-K Force vide the directive issued by Lieutenant General KM Cariappa, GOC-in C, Western Command on 22 March 1948 for the guidance of Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Force. What additional tasks were assigned vide the directive dated 06 April 1984? 1. The general tasks of J-A-K Force were defined as follows: (a) To be prepared to capture Domel. (b) To encourage the re occupation of evacuated villages, and to give every assistance to the state government in this matter. (c) To plan for the withdrawal of the garrison of Jhangar, when ordered to do so by Headquarters Western Command. 2. The particular tasks of J-A-K Force were defined as follows: (a) To consolidate Jhangar and provide for the security of L of C Naushera – Jhangar. (b) To ensure the complete security of Srinagar and Jammu. (c) To continue to hold, with the minimum number, the essential outposts, such as: (i) Akhnoor and its outposts at Chhamb and Beri Pattan. (ii) Naushera. (iii) Uri. (iv) Baramula. (v) Handwara. (vi) Skardu Leh Kargil,with a firm base established at Kargil, (vii) Localities then occupied on L of C Kathua Jammu, JammuNaushera, Jammu Srinagar. (d) To continue to protect the Jammu Pakistan frontier against raids. (e) To plan for the evacuation of the refugees and the garrison of Poonch. (f) To patrol in the direction of Rajauri and establish there a force of one battalion with the essential administrative services, but to forego this if it necessitated offensive operation to secure the objective. 3. Additional tasks assigned vide the directive dated 06 April 1948: (i) If possible to dispatch by air one battalion to reinforce the garrison of Poonch; also to reinforce Skardu garrison so as to bring it to one complete battalion by 20 April 1948. (ii) To carry out operation „Ranjit‟ for the capture of Rajauri. (iii) To secure L of C Naushera Rajauri. (iv) To build up to on additional brigade in the Kashmir Valley. (v) To plan for the evacuation of refugees from Punch. (vi) To plan for occupation of Domel, if possible by 15 May 48. (vii) To establish firm bases at Leh, Kargil, and Gurais..

[Audio] 14 Q9. Discuss the Pakistani raiders’ plan to capture Drass and Kargil giving out the strength, route and the tasking of various attacking columns. Also list the lessons learnt from fall of Kargil in May 48. (a) The Raiders‟ Plan. The hostile commander had approximately 800 men available for Skardu sector. Out of these, 200 men were planned to be left behind to besiege Skardu and interdict advance of relieving columns at Parkutta. The rest were to be used for a „right hook‟ against the Indian line of communications from Sonamarg to Kargil with its base at Chilam Chowky on the main Srinagar – Gilgit route. From Chilam Chowky a force of 250 men were to move South, cross Burzil pass, occupy Gurais, cross Rajdhani Pass and demonstrate against Bandipore to distract Jammu and Kashmir state forces and Indian reserves. Then the raiders were to rush back to Gurais and further East for the real stroke, leaving about 150 men to hold Burzil route and the base of operations. The entire operation was to be carried out in four separate columns with each column being assigned a specific task and independent but coordinated route as under: Column Strength Route Task No 1. Two Gurais – Tilel valley – Baodab Cut the Indian line of platoons turn South – Gund communication at Gund 2. Two Gurais Tilel valley Baodab – Cut the Indian line of platoons communication at Pindrass further East Kaobal Gali Muski Nala Pindrass 3. 100 men Chilam Chowky Deosai Capture Drass Plains Shingo valley Gultari Drass 4. 250 men, Chilam Chowky Deosai Capture Kargil two 3 inch Mortars Plains Shingo valley down the river Shingo Kargil The plan was well formulated. All columns had coordinated marching table to strike their objectives simultaneously on the same day, that is, 10 May 48. Meanwhile, raiders at Parkutta were to fall back gradually towards Skardu drawing the main Indian column with them and away from Kargil. (b) Lessons Learnt from Fall of Kargil. (a) Occupation of dominating heights is important. Had the hill behind Kargil town been occupied by Indian troops, the raiders would have faced great difficulties in capturing Kargil. (b) Communications to ensure early warning is imperative. The Gorkhas at Kharal bridge could not inform Kargil garrison about the impending threat. (c) The raiders made best use of the ground and effectively laid ambushes. (d) The postures of Indian garrisons were generally defensive. Aggressive patrolling and offensive actions are imperative in defences. (e) Effective Air and Arty support and timely reinforcement could have prevented loss of Kargil..

[Audio] 15 Q-1-0--. Due to the Pakistani raiders’ actions to drive away Hindus from the area between Akhnoor and Bhimbar in December 1947, it was decided by the Indian forces to capture Chhamb. Discuss the raiders’ disposition in general area Chhamb, Indian forces tasked for the operation, the attack plan and the major highlights of the operation. a) Raiders‟ Disposition in General Area Chhamb. Approximately 300 raiders were holding Chhamb in strength. Reconnaissance revealed the following: (i) The enemy was deployed on the western bank of Munawwar wali Tawi between Mandiala and Munawwar. (ii) The ground to the West of the river was dominated by well prepared defensive positions at Chhamb. (iii) The river crossing at Chhamb was well mined and covered by enemy fire. (b) Indian Forces Tasked for the Operation. 1 Patiala of 268 Infantry Brigade was tasked to capture Chhamb, with the following troops under command: (i) One company Jammu and Kashmir state force which was deployed in that area. (ii) One troop armoured cars of 7 Cavalry. (iii) One troop of 30 Field Battery. (iv) Support elements including one M-M-G platoon of 1 Mahar. (c) The Out line Plan of 1 Patiala for Capture of Chhamb. (i) C and D companies to cross Munawwar wali Tawi, which runs in the North South direction in the area, 5 kilometers upstream of Chhamb. (ii) The companies to then advance along the western bank of the river towards the objective. (iii) The mortar platoon and section of medium machine guns were to support the attack. (iv) A company to protect the right flank initially. (v) Battalion Headquarters with A company leading to advance along the eastern bank parallel to the advance of C and D company. (vi) A troop of armored cars alongwith two platoons of the Battalion and one section of medium machine guns to demonstrate on a wide front astride the river crossing to suggest a direct approach. (d) Major Highlights of the Operation. Apart from acts of valour the highlight of the operation was the high degree of cooperation between the assaulting troops, armoured cars, Artillery and battalion support weapons..

[Audio] 16 Q-1-4--. What changes were brought by Thimayya in operations of Jammu and Kashmir Forces? Changes in Ops of the Jammu and Kashmir Force. (a) When Thimayya arr in Jammu, he decided that the forces were improperly org for maj ops. He suggested that the force be divided into two, one div for the territory South of Kashmir Valley and another for the valley itself and the territory North and West of it. He was given the div to op in the valley. The fmn was called `Sridiv‟. Its role was to def the valley from further tribal penetration and then to take Muzzafarabad so that the en could not mt further attacks. (b) Thimayya first went to Uri, which was West of Srinagar on the highway that went through the mtns Southeast of Muzzafarabad. About 1500 marauders were in the hills overlooking the highway and blocked the route. North of Uri was the difficult Tithwal Pass which opened directly on to Muzzafarabad. Thimayya appre that even by posing only a threat to the Tithwal Pass, most of marauders would be drawn off to protect it. This would enable him to get another bde along the Uri highway, through the mtns. This bde could then turn North to hit at Muzzafarabad, from the South. A third bde would be needed to secure Uri itself. Thimayya required more tps to carry out the task. But with good lgs plg, incl air dropping sups, he managed to mt an attack. The tribesman were caught off guard and reacted frantically. However they were outnumbered and pushed back. Therefore with his tactful org of forces he could hold Kashmir against an attack from the West. (c) Thimayya next turned his attention to the Razdhanangan Pass. He attacked the main pass first and sent a bn around through the mtns on the Eastern flk. Thimayya‟s men achieved the seemingly impossible feat of defeating the en in the Pass. Subsequently his tps occupied the „Gurais Valley‟. (d) Trg of Men. Though the tps did not have any special equipment, to survive in hostile environment, yet he trained them well to endure blizzards, wade through deep snow and sustain effects of rarefied air. (e) Utilization of Tks. The road from Srinagar to Zojila was barely jeepable. Thimayya improved the road and decided to emp tks on the pass. The unexpected sight and sounds of the armr terrorized the Tribesmen. They fled in panic, and before nightfall Zojila was captured..

[Audio] 17 Q-1-1--. Describe the aim and the attack plan of Indian forces for Operation Birbal. (a) Aim of Op Birbal. In progress of operations towards Poonch it was essential that enemy localities to the North of Rajauri be reduced. While 4 Dogra and 1 Kumaon Rifles were consolidating the defences of Naushera, the necessity of securing Thana Mandi was appreciated. Therefore, the aim of Op Birbal was to capture Thana Mandi. (b) 19 Indep Inf Bde was assigned the task of capturing Thana Mandi. Their plan was: (i) 1 Kumaon Rifles to sieze the feature East of Sain Samut and Point 5603. Thereafter, the battalion was to advance and capture Thana Mandi. (ii) B Company 2/2 Punjab to protect the left flank. (iii) Tanks of Central India Horse to advance along the road and support the attack..

[Audio] 18 Q-1-2--. The capture of Zoji La by Indian forces was a typically rare operation. Discuss the following: (a) What was the attack plan for Operation Bison, carried out in Nov 48? (b) What were the problems envisaged in employment of armour and what measures were adopted to overcome them? (c) Enumerate the reasons for the success in capture of Zoji La during Operation Bison..

[Audio] 19 General. After two attack plans, involving „turning movement from the left‟ and „frontal attack‟, had failed; a brilliant plan codenamed “Operation Bison” was made to clear Zoji La using tanks with a feint attack in Suru valley. (a) Attack Plan for Operation Bison. (i) Tanks of C Squadron, 7 Cavalry to advance through Zoji La to deal with the formidable enemy positions at Mukand, Chabutara, M-M-G Ridge and North Hill. (ii) A company of 1 Patiala to follow the tanks in covered carriers to Gumri. (iii) 1/5 GR supported by three batteries to mop up and capture Mukand after tanks reach Gumri. (iv) Platoons of 5 Maratha to occupy high ground near Chabutara and prevent enemy at Chabutara from launching a counter attack, while Mukand and M-M-G ridge were being captured. (v) A plan was worked out in great detail including the employment of air, artillery, and the use of smoke ammunition and the control of civil traffic in Sind valley. (b) Employment of Armour for Operation Bison. (i) Problems Envisaged. (aa) Performance of the tank engines and the lubricating system at such a high altitude was neither tested nor could be confidently predicted. (ab) Bridges en route were not strong enough. (ac) The route was too long and difficult for the tanks. (ad) The shape and size of the tanks made maintaining surprise difficult. (ii) Actions Taken to Overcome the Problems Envisaged. (aa) Track was improved by Engineers. (ab) Gun turrets were removed from tanks to reduce the weight and thus resolving problem of weak bridges. (ac) Removal of turret also helped in making them look like T-16 weapon carriers. To deceive the enemy into believing this, a few T-1-6's were also moved from Srinagar to Baltal. (ad) Curfew was imposed in Srinagar when the tanks moved through the city. (ae) Drivers were given extra training for driving on the arduous route. (c) The reasons for the success in capture of Zoji La during Operation Bison are as enumerated below: (i) Employment of light tanks at an altitude of 11578 feet through an arduous mountain track, despite all odds and technical challenges was a bold and novel concept. (ii) The planning for the attack was done in great details, and included the following aspects also: (aa) Air support. (ab) Arty support. (ac) Use of smoke ammunition. (ad) Regulation of civil traffic. (ae) Surprise and deception plans. (iii) For carriage of tanks over weak bridges and deception, gun turrets of the tanks were removed, carried separately and again assembled at Baltal. (iv) A feint attack was also planned in Suru Valley. (v) Adequate artillery support was made available and planned. (vi) Adverse weather and visibility conditions were utilized to own advantage. (vii) Principles of offensive action and surprise were optimally implemented. (viii) The attack plan was simple and.

[Audio] 20 Q-1-3--. Give the broad outline plan for Operation Gulmarg launched by Pakistan in Oct 47. Also, list out the circumstances which favoured the launch of the above operation. (a) Broad Out Plan for Operation Gulmarg. (i) The Main Thrust. Six Lashkars to advance along the main road Muzzafarabad to Srinagar via Domel, Uri and Baramulla with the specific task to capture Srinagar airport and advance beyond to Banihal Pass. (ii) Subsidiary Thrust 1. Two Lashkars to secure the right flank of the main force by advancing from Haji Pir pass directly to Gulmarg. (iii) Subsidiary Thrust 2. A similar force of two Lashkars to advance from Tithwal through the Nastachun Pass to capture Sopore, Handwara and Bandipur. (iv) Another force of ten Lashkars to operate in Poonch, Bhimbar and Rawalkot area with the aim of capturing Poonch, Rajauri and then advance to Jammu. (v) The D day was fixed as 22 Oct 1947, on which date, the various Lashkars were to cross into J & K territory. (vi) 7 Infantry Division of Pakistan army concentrated in area MurreeAbbotabad by night of 21 Oct 47, ready to move into J & K to back up the tribal Lashkars and consolidate their hold on the valley. (vii) One Infantry Brigade was also held ready in Sialkot to move on to Jammu. (b) Factors Favouring Operation Gulmarg. (i) Communications. As major communications emanated from the West, that is the direction adopted by the aggressor, easy move into the valley was facilitated..

[Audio] 21 (ii) Opposition. The combat fitness of the J & K State Forces could not be graded at par with regular forces. Therefore, a minimal degree of resistance was expected by the hostiles. (iii) Opposition by Indian Army. Opposition by the Indian Army was not expected due to the following reasons: (aa) Heavy commitments in internal security duties. (ab) Unfavourable time and space due to inadequate communication system. (ac) Initial raids in Sept 1947 evoked no reaction from India. (iv) Surprise. Surprise was completely in favour of the aggressor as the J & K State Forces as well as the administration, being in a state of disarray, were likely to be caught unawares. The intelligence organization in the state was also not effective. (v) Subversion. Subversion of loyalty of a large number of Muslims in the State forces had undermined the fighting potential of these units. This was further reduced due to the dispersed deployment..

[Audio] 22 Q-1-4--. Explain the military implications of the state of communications in J & K as existing in 1947 – 48. The implications of the existing communications on military operations ins(J&K) in 1947-48 were as under: (a) All major communications to the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 emanated from the West through the province of West Punjab, later Pakistan, thus increasing its vulnerability to being cut off from that direction. Effective blockade of the state could be imposed by denial of communications from the West. (b) The communication system favoured launching of operations from the West, that is, through Pakistan. (c) Operations from the South were difficult to sustain due to two major obstacles: (i) The Banihal Pass. (ii) Numerous weak links on the Road Pathankot – Jammu. This road transborder raids. (d) Due to exclusive dependence on motor transport, the loads to be carried were restricted. Demand on the motor transport was thus very heavy. (e) Air transported operations assumed a major importance in the Kashmir valley for Indian forces. These were rendered difficult due to the following reasons: (i) Limited availability of air strips. (ii) Poor facilities at the existing airfields. (iii) Limited availability of air transport resources. Q-1-5--. Discuss the aspects highlighted during the Indian defence of Leh garrison. The salient aspects of the operation for Indian defence of Leh garrison are enumerated as under: (a) Defence of Leh highlighted the importance of logistics. Reinforcement and supplies by air was one of the most effective ways without which Leh could not have been defended. (b) The leadership of raiders at Ladakh was found vastly different from that of other sectors. The leadership lacked inspiration, daring and decisiveness. (c) The raiders did not miss any opportunity to counter attack a lost position and in numerous cases they succeeded. The raiders were very tenacious in their efforts. (d) The Indian troops displayed a high standard of training in terms of patrolling. (e) Exemplary junior leadership was displayed. During a raiders‟ attack at Dhumkhar on 26 Jun 48 only two platoons of 2/4 GR beat back an attack of 600 raiders killing two officers and 28 raiders with just one casualty on own side. (f) Effective Civil Administration. In the interest of the state, on 19 Aug 48 Col HS Parab, CO 2/8 GR, the senior most officer of Leh garrison was appointed as Military Governor of Leh and was given extraordinary powers. He handled the civil administration very effectively.. (g) Leadership by Personal Example. No aircraft had ever landed on the small and ill prepared air field of Leh. But reinforcements and supplies were essential for the defence of Leh. No air force officer knew whether Dakotas could fly across the Himalayas flying at high altitude and land at Leh. So the gallant Air Officer Commanding Number 1 Operations Group. Air Commodore Mehar Singh, D-S-O himself flew a Dakota and landed at Leh. Moreover, he was accompanied by Maj Gen Thimmayya, G-O-C Srinagar Division. (h) Senior staff officers visited forward areas to get first hand information.

[Audio] 23 Q-1-6--. Enumerate the difficulties faced by the Indian Army in the preparations and launching of operations in the initial stages of Indo Pak war of 1947-48. The difficulties experienced by the Indian Army in the initial stages of launching operations in Kashmir in October 1947 were as follows: (a) Lack of intelligence on enemy strength and deployment. (b) Non existence of secure land communications. (c) Non availability of maps of the area. (d) Pre occupation with internal security operations in Punjab and other parts of the country. (e) Preoccupation with the reorganization of the Army into Indian and Pakistan Army. (f) Problems faced in the mustering of units for induction intos(J&K) were as under: (i) Widespread deployment of units on internal security duties in northern India. (ii) Units were split into platoon and company sized picquets. (iii) The dispersed picquets lacked communications and thus it was time consuming to recall them. (iv) The troops on internal security duties had to be relieved. This relief was time consuming. (v) Inadequacy of transport to muster the forces. (vi) Some units were involved a last minute change in command as British officers were prohibited from accompanying troops into Jammu and Kashmir. Q-1-7--. List the factors that brought about success in the Battle of Shalateng. The causes of own success in the Battle of Shalateng can by analyzed as under: (a) The surprise achieved by sudden appearance of armoured cars of 7 Cav in the rear of the raiders, which had moved left from near Gandharbal and joined the main Baramulla Srinagar road at Shalateng. (b) Simultaneous multidirectional attacks on the raiders by 1 Kumaon in the South, 1 Sikh in the East and the armoured cars in the West. (c) Effective air strikes by the R-I-A-F using incendiary rockets and bombs on the raiders hidden in the haystacks. (d) Exploitation of the initial success by a company of 1 Sikh mounted in trucks in conjunction with the armoured cars, which hotly pursued the fleeing raiders and captured a large cache of arms, ammunition, vehicles and medical supplies..

[Audio] 24 Q-1-8--. The re capture of Jhangar was a major victory achieved by Indian forces. Discuss the above operation under the following heads: (a) The objectives of first phase and second phase of operations, in brief. (b) Pakistani deployment in gen A Jhangar and composition of attacking Indian forces for Third phase of operations. (c) Indian operational plan, Op Vijay, for capture of Jhangar. (d) Reasons for successful conduct of Op Vijay. 1. The objectives of first two phases of operations leading to recapture of Jhangar were as under: (a) First Phase. In the first phase of the operations (07-29 February 1948), the garrison of Naushera confined its activities to probing into enemy positions. (b) Second Phase. Operations for the capture of Ambli Dhar and Kaman Gosha Gala were carried out from 01 to 04 Mar 48, codenamed as Operation Bharatpur. 2. Enemy Deployment. Enemy Deployment in gen A Jhangar was as under: (a) Brigade headquarters and a battalion at Jhangar. (b) A battalion at Pir Thil. (c) A battalion withdrew towards Laroka to the East of Jhangar. (d) Strong points of the enemy were located at various points on the Handan hill range to the North of the Naushera – Jhangar axis as follows: (i) Forward Line of Defences. Approximately 6-8 kilometers north west of Naushera upto Kanara. (ii) Second Line of Defences. Extended from area Gaikot forest, Nakka defile upto Jhangar Dharamsal. (iii) Other pockets of enemy resistance included Khambah fort, Kalsian, Nothi Dhar and a few dominating heights in the area. 3. Availability of Indian Forces. Indian Forces Available for Re capture of Jhangar was as under: (a) 19 Independent Brigade Group. (i) 4 Dogra. (ii) 1 Kumaon. (iii) Two companies of 1 Rajput. (iv) One troop of light tanks of 7 Cavalry. (v) 5 Mountain Battery with an addl battery and a troop on call. (b) 50 Para Brigade. (i) 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry. (ii) 3 (Para) Rajput. (iii) 1 Patiala. (iv) One troop each of light tanks and armoured cars of 7 Cavalry. (v) 7 Mountain Battery with two additional troops on call..

[Audio] 25 (c) Armoured Column. 7 Cavalry less B squadron with one squadron of Central India Horse. One company of 1 Rajput was also grouped with this column. (d) Force Reserve. 1 Rajput less two companies. One of the companies was grouped with 7 Cavalry. 4. Operational Plan for Re capture of Jhangar. Broadly, the plan envisaged a twin thrust using both the brigade groups. The essential aspects of the plan were: (a) Concentration of the armoured column at Naushera with utmost secrecy. (b) Own troops deployed at Ambli Dhar and to the West of the road to Jhangar to provide flank protection. (c) Establishment of firm bases at the outset of respective axes. (d) Advance of 50 Para Brigade Group on axis Pir Thil – West of Nakka – Jhangar. (e) Advance of 19 Independent Brigade Group on axis Jabbar – Gaikot – Jhangar. (f) The armoured column to thrust along road Naushera – Jhangar..

[Audio] 26 5. Reasons for Successful Conduct of Operation Vijay. The recapture of Jhangar was enabled due to the following reasons: (a) Well Conceived Operational Plan. (i) Own force levels and axes of advance were based on a realistic appreciation of the enemy‟s strengths. (ii) Assigning independent axes to the two brigade groups proved very beneficial in exterminating the enemy defences on either side of road Naushera Jhangar. (b) The fortitude and valour of own troops in vanquishing determined enemy resistance proved decisive in critical circumstances. (c) Flexibility. The plans could accommodate the vagaries of the weather without being adversely affected. (d) Detailed reconnaissance preceding the attacks was immensely valuable. (e) Deception Measures. Diversionary attacks and artillery fire were directed on picquets facing approaches of attack that were not finally attacked. (f) Employment of Artillery. Reliance on massed artillery fire and effectiveness of the same. (g) Use of Armour. (i) Secrecy of induction. (ii) Overwhelming effect on hostiles. (h) Extensive use of air effort for interdiction tasks and close air support..

[Audio] 27 Q 19. In the Northern sector, the re capture of Gurais was an important operation carried out by Indian forces. Discuss the above operation under the following heads: (a) The importance of Gurais. (b) Pakistani deployment in gen A Gurais and composition of attacking Indian forces for Operation Eraze. (c) Options available and the final attack plan. (d) Lessons learnt from successful conduct of Op Eraze. 1. Importance of Gurais. (a) Gurais was an important point in the communication system as five important approaches / routes converged at this place. They were:.

[Audio] 28 (i) To Srinagar. Gurais – Kanzalwan Rajdhan Pass – Tragbal – Bandipore skirting Wular Lake Srinagar. (ii) To Gilgit. Gurais –Chorwan Kauri Burgil Pass down Astor River – Indus valley Gilgit. (iii) To Muzafarabad & Punjab. Gurais – Kanzalwan BaghorTaobat along Kishanganga River to Muzaffarabad& Punjab. (iv) To Drass / Muski Nala. Gurais Tilel Valley Kashpal –Baodab Kaobal Gali Muski Nala Drass. (v) To Gund / Sonamarg. Gurais Tilel Valley Kashpal – Baodab – Gund Sonamarg. (b) Srinagar Gilgit was an important and ancient caravan route, which passed through Gurais. (c) The Kishanganga valley in this area was flanked by precipitous heights. (d) Occupation of Gurais sector dominated several routes / tracks and hence it importance. (e) A map of the general area of Gurais is attached as Appendix B 2. Pakistani Dply in gen A Gurais. Approximately 400 raiders deployed as under: (a) One platoon and one detachment mortars at Pt 7645 to bock Kanzalwan route; and fifteen men at Pt 8048. (b) One platoon and one detachment mortars at Malak Kadal to guard Dodakbatun track. (c) Two platoons and one detachment mortars at Khapuri to guard entrance to Gurais; and one section to guard the bridge. (d) HQ, one platoon and one detachment mortars at Badwan. (e) One platoon and one detachment mortars at Darikhun to guard Viji Gali route. (f) One platoon at Dawar as reserve. (g) One platoon at Godor to guard their lines of communications. 3. Indian Forces Availabe for Operation Eraze. (a) 1 Indian Grenadiers – Battalion HQ & two coys at Tragbal, one coy less one platoon at Atthawattu and one platoon & Adm coy at Bandipur. (b) 2/4 Gorkha Rifles – additional battalion made available. (c) Patiala Mountain Battery – placed under command of 1 Indian Grenadiers. 4. Options Available. One battalion was to capture general area Kanzalwan and another battalion was to capture Gurais. There were two possible routes from Rajdhani Pass to Gurais. The routes and their pros and cons are discussed as under: (a) Route One. Rajdhani Pass Kanzalwan up the valley of river Kishanganga – Gurais. This was an ancient caravan route which was well known, well guarded and an easy mule track. (b) Route Two. Rajdhani Pass – Eastwards along the mountain crests – Kuljan Gali 1 – Kuljan Gali 2 Meadow of Viji Gali – Darikhun Gali – Wampore – Gurais. This was a goat track known only to Gujars. It was a very tough and unexpected route that abruptly emerged into the Kishanganga valley..

[Audio] 29 (c) Finally „Route Two‟ was selected, since „Route One‟ was most expected. Moreover, the enemy could foil the plan by blowing up the bridges on the Kishanganga river. On the other hand „Route Two‟ was most unexpected and had a high element of surprise. 5. Final Attack Plan. (a) On D minus 1 Day. 2/4 GR was to attack from the left of Charpathar to pin down the enemy and confirm his suspicion of attack along Kanzalwan route. (b) On D Day. 1 Grenadiers was to strike Gurais from the right along Viji Gali route. (c) Air strikes were planned on D minus1, D day and “on call” during the operations. 6. Lessons Learnt from Op Eraze. (a) Aggressive patrolling is very important to dominate a given area, and to discern enemy‟s deployment and intentions. Troops must be fully proficient in patrolling which is known to be the acid test of a soldier‟s abilities. (b) Air lifting of arty guns can be very effective to ensure availability of guns within range and maintain surprise. (c) A defeated enemy should not be underestimated. A counter attack or riposte should always be prepared for. (d) Attacking from an unexpected direction along an unexpected route ensures its success. There is no substitute to surprise. The “Strategy of Indirect Approach” was exemplified by Operation Eraze. (e) Importance of occupation of dominating heights in mountain warfare was reemphasized..

[Audio] 30 Q 20. Discuss the outline plan of 161 Infantry Brigade for relief of Poonch in Nov 1947? Also analyze the reasons for failure of the above operations. 1. General. As per the plan for the relief of Poonch garrison by Jammu and Kashmir Division in Nov 1947, 161 Infantry Brigade was to act as the northern pincer of the overall force employed from Uri to Poonch and 50 Para Brigade was to form the southern pincer from Jammu to Naushera and Poonch. 2. Outline Plan of 161 Infantry Brigade. The outline plan of operations was as under: (a) The advance was to be made in three groups as under: (i) First Group 2 Dogra..

[Audio] 31 (ii) Second Group 1 Kumaon. (iii) Third Group Administrative elements. (b) 2 Dogra was to move ahead and secure the Haji Pir Pass in the first phase. (c) Beyond the Haji Pir Pass, advance was to be led by the armoured car troop. (d) On reaching Poonch, 1 Kumaon was to join the Poonch garrison while the remainder column was to return to Uri. (e) Civil transport had also been requisitioned for timely move of the troops. (f) The link up was thus expected to be completed in one day. 3. Reasons for Failure of Above Operations. (a) Lack of Reconnaissance. Lack of reconnaissance of Road Uri Pooch led to the plan being based on use of civil vehicles and a too optimistic time frame. (b) Lack of Coordination. There was a lack of coordination of operations by Headquarters J-A-K Division. Thereby, the Pooch Brigade was not informed of the advance of 161 Infantry Brigade. This led to the fatal decision of demolition of bridge at Kahoka by the state forces at Pooch garrison. (c) Inadequacy of Transport. Inadequacy of service transport capable of undertaking the hard grind to Hajji Pir Pass led to hiring of civil transport incapable of such a movement. This in turn delayed the force until move was undertaken on foot. (d) Over Emphasis on Security. An over emphasis on security led to plans remaining undisclosed even to own troops such as the Poonch Brigade. (e) Lack of Vigilance. Lack of vigilance and observation of basic precautions led to the ambush and burning down of the bridge at Milestone 7. This resulted in a delay of three days in return of 161 Infantry Brigade to Uri. Q-2-1--. Skardu garrison held out for more than six months before falling into enemy hands. Briefly discuss the difficulties faced by the Indian troops. Also list out the positive aspects of the Indian defence and the lessons learnt. 1. General. Skardu was the headquarters of a huge Himalayan Tehsil. Lt Col Sher Singh Thapa of 6 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry was responsible for protection of the Skardu garrison. After the fall of Gilgit, the raiders repeatedly attacked Skardu garrison. They effectively used M-M-G-s-, 3.7” howitzer and 3” mortars. The siege continued for six months, before falling into the hands of the raiders. 2. Difficulties Faced by Indian Troops. (a) Stocking of the garrison with ammunition, ration and medicines was highly inadequate. (b) Reinforcements could not reach in time. (c) Columns did not move tactically. As a result they were ambushed/ subjected to heavy fire and suffered heavy casualties. (d) R-I-A-F was heavily committed. It also had an acute shortage of transporters and fighter aircraft. The existing aircrafts had very limited capabilities. (e) Battalion support weapons and artillery were not available. 3. Positive Aspects of Indian Defence..

[Audio] 32 (a) Despite all possible odds, the troops fought with great courage. (b) Lt Col Sher Singh Thapa sited the automatics very effectively. (c) Skardu garrison fought because of the able leadership and dauntless courage of its commander, Lt Col Sher Singh Thapa who was later awarded the MVC. 4. Lessons Learnt. (a) Movement should always be tactical. While moving along a river in a valley or gorge, movement should be bestrides the river stream. (b) Adequate stocking of garrisons with arms, ammunition, rations and medicines is essential. (c) Operations of the Air Force assume great importance in areas of difficult access for fire support and logistics. Q-2-2--. Analyse the reasons for failure of the operations of relief of Poonch carried out by Indian forces in Nov 1947? 1. General. Brigadier LP Sen, Commander 161 Infantry Brigade, had written an appreciation of the situation on 28 January 1948 regarding the advance towards Domel. This appreciation, with slight modifications, served as an admirable basis for the plan for the spring offensive. Brigadier Sen took into consideration the suitability of the various routes for an advance to Domel. 2. Options Available. (a) Advance on the Uri Domel road axis over a distance of 72 kilometers. (b) Advance through Pir Panjal Ranges. 3. Option Selected. After taking into consideration the following aspects, Brigadier Sen came to the conclusion that the main thrust should be along the road Uri Domel: (a) The main road from Uri to Domel was a first class road, 72 kilometers in length. Between Uri and Domel there were 22 bridges. Of these 8 were of wooden structure, 3 had masonry arches and 11 were of steel. (b) The chief draw back of advancing by this route was that the enemy, who was well trained in demolishing bridges, would destroy as many bridges as possible while retreating, thus impeding the advance. (c) Apart from this possibility, the enemy expected an attack to be made from this direction, and would, therefore, be well prepared to meet the attack. Carefully planned defensive enemy positions would block the advance to Domel. (d) On the other hand, the assaulting troops would have the support of armour and artillery. Superior fire power would be a very important factor. Experience had conclusively shown that the enemy attacked only when in overwhelming strength. When faced by a strong force, supported by armour and artillery, he avoided battle and took to the hills to engage in guerilla warfare. (e) Further the maintenance of a column advancing from Uri would be easier if it operated along the axis of the main road Uri Domel. (f) To maintain morale, the evacuation of casualties must be swift, which could best be effected by the use of vehicles. 4. Plan for Capture of Domel. Based on this appreciation Brigadier Sen planned to capture Domel in three phases:.

[Audio] 33 (a) Phase I Chinari was to be captured by a double attack an advance by two battalions (supported by artillery and armour) along the main road Uri Domel and an advance by three battalions along the hills south of the main road Uri Domel via Nawa, Khariana, and Summan. (b) Phase 2. Garhi was to be captured. (c) Phase 3. Capture of Domel. Q-2-3--. After the fall of Pandu, what options were available to General Thimayya for stabilizing the situation in Uri sector and which course was selected by him for implementation?.

[Audio] 34 1. General. After the major reverse at Pandu, Gen Thimayya appreciated that the enemy had several alternatives to attack: (a) Attack North of Jhelum to cut the line of communication. (b) Attack through Kafir Khan range to disrupt the communications of 163 Brigade. (c) Attack on Uri. (d) Attack along the main road from Chakothi, combined with subsidiary attack either North of Jhelum or South of river to cut communication between Uri and Rampur. 2. Options Available. Gen Thimayya had the following options to stabilize the situation in Uri sector: (a) To withdraw the defences of Uri to Tithwal. (b) To hold the enemy from existing positions. 3. Final Plan. Gen Thimayya decided to combine both these courses, in other words to hold the enemy from existing position and hold existing defence line with secondary defence line at Uri. He estimated that 21 battalions were required for this option whereas only 18 were available. The following localities were included in the defended area : (a) Locality ‘A’. Chinal Dori – Uri. (b) Locality ‘B’. Heman Bhuiyar to Milestone 68. (c) Locality ‘C’. Milestone 58 Pir Kanthi including Pir Panjal ranges. Q-2-4--. Describe the administrative and military setup ins(J&K) prior to accession to India? 1. Administrative Setup. (a) The administration of the state, both civil and military was headed by the Maharaja. He was the head of the govt as well as the C-in C of the State Army. (b) The capital of the state was Srinagar in summer and Jammu in winter. (c) The state had four provinces, namely, Jammu, Srinagar, Gilgit and Ladakh, each under a Governor. 2. Military Setup. (a) The military administration comprised an Army HQ at Srinagar and four brigades. (b) After independence, the Army HQ was headed by an Indian Chief of Staff, Brigadier Rajinder Singh of thes(J&K) State Force. (c) The four brigades were: (i) Jammu Brigade at Jammu. (ii) The Kashmir Brigade with the Body Guard Cavalry and 7s(J&K) Rifles at Srinagar. The other infantry battalions of the Brigade were committed in the Domel – Kohala area..

[Audio] 35 (iii) The Mirpur Brigade with HQ at Jhangar. (iv) The Poonch Brigade in the Poonch Rawalkot area. (d) The four brigades had only eight infantry battalions between them with some garrison police companies and animal and mechanical transport. (e) The state force had no artillery or armour. (f) There was a wireless link with Rawalpindi, but none with New Delhi. Q-2-5--. What tasks were allotted to 1 Sikh and what actions were taken by CO 1 Sikh immediately on being inducted intos(J&K) in Oct 1947? 1. Tasks Allotted to 1 Sikh. (a) Hold Srinagar airfield and civil aviation wireless station at all costs. (b) Ensure immunity of Srinagar air field from enemy action, thereby facilitating further landings. (c) Having achieved this, take measures to push back the raiders from Srinagar. (d) Assist local govt to maintain law and order in Srinagar. 2. Actions Taken by 1 Sikh. (a) 1 Sikh landed at Srinagar airfield on the morning of 27 October. The battalion strength was about 300 men, being less two companies, though supplemented by one battery of 13 Field Regiment in infantry role. (b) One company was deployed for the defence of Srinagar airfield. (c) The Battalion less two companies advanced towards Pattan, 17 miles from Srinagar, and then to Baramulla, 34 miles from Srinagar. Thus a clear run of 34 miles to Srinagar, only two hours of travelling time by road, was denied to the raiders. (d) A clash with raiders occurred East of Baramulla and 1 Sikh withdrew as the raiders were numerically superior and equipped with modern weapons. (e) On 28 Oct 1947, a second clash took place with the raiders East of Baramulla. (f) 1 Sikh then withdrew to Pattan during which action its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rai was killed by a stray bullet. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. (g) Taking advantage of the defence potential of the ground at Pattan, it was able to beat back further attacks by the raiders. But it sent back an urgent message that it could not hold the numerically superior enemy for long, without reinforcements.

[Audio] 36 Q-2-6--. What was the aim of launching Operation Cheeta and what were the lessons learnt from it? 1. Aim of Operation Cheeta. To destroy enemy base established at Assar and Kadala which were approximately 8 kilometers from Bhimbar and to inflict maximum casualties. 2. Force Level. A force designated as „Cheeta Force‟ was comprised as under: (a) 7th Light Cavalry. (i) Regiment Headquarters and Headquarter Squadron with a troop of armoured cars each. (ii) A Squadron of Stuart tanks. (b) Two troops of Central India Horse. (c) 1/7 Rajput (motorized). 3. Lessons Learnt. (a) Bold pre emptive actions achieve decisive results as to debilitate the enemy‟s future operations. (b) Maintenance of surprise in build up of forces is crucial to successful execution of plans. (c) Swift and deep thrusts by mechanised forces can throw the enemy‟s defences off gear. (d) Use of unconventional approaches can serve the twin purpose of surprising the enemy as well as preventing reinforcement..